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Abstract
In this paper we analyze a stochastic continuous time model in finite horizon in
which agents discount the instantaneous utility function and the final function at
constant but different instantaneous discount rates of time preference. Within this
context we can model problems in which, when the time t approaches to the final time,
the valuation of the final function increases compared with previous valuations in a way
that cannot be explained by using a unique constant or a variable discount rate. We
derive a dynamic programming equation whose solutions are time-consistent Markov
equilibria. For this class of time preferences, we study the classical consumption and
portfolio rules model (Merton, 1971) for CRRA and CARA utility functions for time-
consistent agents, and we compare the different equilibria with the time-inconsistent
solutions. The introduction of stochastic terminal time is also discussed.
Abstract
En aquest treball s’analitza un model estoca`stic en temps continu en el que l’agent
decisor descompta les utilitats instanta`nies i la funcio´ final amb taxes de prefere`ncia
temporal constants pero` diferents. En aquest context es poden modelitzar problemes
en els quals, quan el temps t s’acosta al moment final, la valoracio´ de la funcio´ final
incrementa en comparacio´ amb les utilitats instanta`nies. Aquest tipus d’ asimetria no
es pot descriure ni amb un descompte esta`ndard ni amb un variable. Per tal d’obtenir
solucions consistents temporalment es deriva l’equacio´ de programacio´ dina`mica es-
toca`stica, les solucions de la qual so´n equilibris Markovians. Per a aquest tipus de pre-
fere`ncies temporals, s’estudia el model cla`ssic de consum i inversio´ (Merton, 1971) per
a les funcions d’utilitat del tipus CRRA i CARA, comparant els equilibris Markovians
amb les solucions inconsistents temporalment. Finalment es discuteix la introduccio´
del temps final aleatori.
JEL classification: C61; G11; C73
Keywords: heterogeneous discounting; consumption and portfolio rules; time-consistency;
dynamic programming
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1 Introduction
In the study of intertemporal choices it is customary in economics to consider the so-
called Discounted Utility (DU) Model, introduced in Samuelson (1937). According to
the Samuelson’s model, time preferences can be characterized by a single parameter, the
discount rate. Since the DU model assumes a constant discount rate of time preference,
it can be easily shown (due to the properties of the exponential function) that constant
discounting implies that agent’s time preferences are time-consistent. However, empirical
observations seem to show that predictions of the DU model disagree with the actual
behavior of decision makers (we refer to Frederick et al (2002) for an analysis on the topic
and a review of the literature up to (2002)). These anomalies can be of several types.
The best documented DU anomaly is hyperbolic discounting (or non-constant dis-
counting, in general). Strotz (1956) studied the effects of choosing a variable rate of time
preference, illustrating how for a very simple model preferences are time consistent if, and
only if, the discount function is an exponential with a constant discount rate. Effects
of the so-called quasi-hyperbolic (or quasi-geometric) discount functions introduced by
Phelps and Pollak (1968) have been extensively studied in a discrete time context, within
the field of behavioral economics. The most relevant effect of non-constant discounting is
that preferences change along time. In this sense, an agent making a decision at time t has
different time preferences compared with those at the initial time t0. In a continuous time
setting, a dynamic programming equation (DPE) providing a time-consistent solution was
introduced in Karp (2007) in a deterministic framework. This DPE was extended to the
case where the evolution of the state variables is governed by a set of stochastic differential
equations in Ekeland and Pirvu (2008) and Mar´ın-Solano and Navas (2010).
Although hyperbolic discounting relaxes the assumption of using a constant discount
rate for all time periods, it does not solve all the anomalies of the DU model. As pointed
out in Frederick et al (2002), the DU model assumes also that the discount rate should be
the same for all types of goods and all categories of intertemporal decisions, and this is in
contradiction with several empirical regularities.
In this paper we study a simple approach (giving rise, as in the case of hyperbolic
discounting, to time-inconsistent preferences) which can provide a model for certain be-
haviors that can not be explained by the DU model or more general hyperbolic preferences.
More precisely, we are interested in preferences representing a situation in which the agent
discounts in a different way the utilities enjoyed along the planning horizon and that of
the bequest or final function. Hence, the intertemporal utility function takes the form
Ut =
∫ T
t
d(s, t)u(x, c, s) ds+ d(T, t)F (x(T ), T ) .
with d(s, t) = e−ρ(s−t) for s < T , and d(T, t) = e−ρ¯(T−t), for ρ 6= ρ¯, in general.
Impatient agents over-valuing the utilities u(x(s), c(s), s) in comparison with the fi-
nal function F (x(T ), T ) are characterized by ρ¯ > ρ. However, when time passes, the
final function increases its relative value in comparison with the instantaneous utilities
u(x(s), c(s), s) (usually due to consumption and hence to an immediate benefit). This
asymmetric valuation cannot be described by a standard discount function or in general
with non-constant discounting. There are several problems that seem to be good candi-
dates for this description: human capital formation, where the the final function represents
the utility obtained after a period of continuous effort; consumption and portfolio rule
problems, where the final function represents a bequest function (the individual is more
concerned with the welfare of her descendants when life is arriving to the end); or, along
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the same lines, retirement and pension problems. Since preferences are time-inconsistent,
no optimal solutions exist, and the standard techniques in optimal control theory (the
Pontryagin’s Maximum Principle or the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation) give rise to
time-inconsistent solutions. By reproducing the literature of non-constant discounting,
we can say that an agent is naive if she does not take into account that her preferences
will change in the future, so she is time-inconsistent. In order to obtain time-consistent
solutions (agents are sophisticated, using the standard terminology in non-constant dis-
counting), Markov perfect equilibria must be calculated.
This problem with heterogeneous discounting was introduced in Mar´ın-Solano and
Patxot (2011) in a deterministic setting. In that paper, a DPE providing a time-consistent
solution was derived by using a variational approach, and an economic motivation was
given. Such DPE is rather similar to the one first derived by Karp (2007) for the problem
with non-constant discounting. An important limit in the approach introduced in that
paper is that the DPE is a functional equation with a nonlocal term. As a consequence, it
becomes very complicated to find solutions, not only analytically, but also numerically. In
this paper we extend the results in the deterministic setting to a stochastic environment,
by deriving a set of two coupled partial differential equations which are equivalent (in
the deterministic setting) to the DPE derived in Mar´ın-Solano and Patxot (2011). This
approach allows us to compute (analytically or numerically) the solutions for different
economic problems. In particular, we are interested in analyzing how time-inconsistent
preferences with heterogeneous discounting modify the classical consumption and portfolio
rules (Merton (1971)). We show that, similar to the problem with non-constant discount-
ing, within the HARA (hyperbolic absolute risk aversion) utility functions, if the relative
risk aversion is constant (logarithmic and power utility functions), the equilibrium portfo-
lio rule does not depend on the rate of time preference. This nice property is not satisfied
for more general utility functions, such as the (constant absolute risk aversion) exponential
function. With respect to the consumption rules, for the case of heterogeneous discount-
ing, they are different, not only quantitatively, but mainly qualitatively, to the equilibria
derived for the case of non-constant discounting in continuous time in Mar´ın-Solano and
Navas (2010). The effects on the consumption rule of introducing heterogeneous discount-
ing are illustrated numerically for the case of power and exponential utility functions. As
a final contribution we show that, if the final time is a random variable, our problem
with heterogeneous discounting transforms into a problem which is equivalent to a model
introduced (in a deterministic setting) in Mar´ın-Solano and Shevkoplyas (2011). In this
case, we must search for a time-consistent equilibrium in a cooperative differential game
with heterogeneous agents.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the model. In Section 3 we
first derive the DPE in a discrete time setting and then, we find the formal continuous time
limit. As a result, we recover the DPE in the deterministic setting as a particular case.
This provides a justification to the mathematically rigorous but less intuitive procedure
used in Mar´ın-Solano and Patxot (2011). Next, we define the notion of equilibrium rule
as in Mar´ın-Solano and Patxot (2011) (which is based on the one in Ekeland and Pirvu
(2008)), and the DPE is obtained by using a variational approach. In Section 4, this
equation is solved for the consumption and portfolio rules problem for some particular
utility functions. Section 5 analyzes the problem for the case of random time horizon.
Finally, Section 6 contains the main conclusions of the paper.
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2 The Model
We introduce the problem in a discrete time and deterministic setting. For each pe-
riod s, s = 0, 1, 2, . . . , T − 1, let xs = (x1s, . . . , xns ) be the vector of state variables and
cs = (c
1
s, . . . , c
m
s ) the vector of control (or decision) variables. If us(xs, cs, s) is the utility
function at period s and F (xT , T ) is the final (or bequest) function, in the conventional
model, the intertemporal utility function of an agent taking decisions at period t takes the
form
Ut =
T−1∑
s=t
δs−tus(xs, cs, s) + δT−tF (xT , T ) ,
where the state variables evolve according to the state equation xs+1 = f(xs, cs, s), for
s = t, . . . , T − 1. In order to maximize Ut we must solve an optimal control problem
and, since the discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1] is always the same, the solution becomes time
consistent. In general, if we consider an arbitrary discount d(s, t) representing how the
agent at time t discounts future utilities enjoyed at time s ≥ t, the intertemporal utility
function at period t is given by
Ut =
T−1∑
s=t
d(s, t)us(xs, cs, s) + d(T, t)F (xT , T ) .
In the standard case, d(s, t) = δs−t. If time preferences are quasi-hyperbolic, d(s, t) =
βδs−t for s > t, and d(t, t) = 1. In this paper we are interested in preferences representing
a situation in which the agent discounts in a different way the utilities enjoyed along the
planning horizon, and the final function. In particular, we assume that the discount rate
takes the form d(s, t) = δs−t for s < T , and d(T, t) = δ¯T−t. The intertemporal utility
function becomes
Ut =
T−1∑
s=t
δs−tus(xs, cs, s) + δ¯T−tF (xT , T ) .
Following Mar´ın-Solano and Patxot (2011), we call these time preferences heterogeneous
discounting.
Next, we extend the model to a continuous time setting. Let x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ X ⊆
Rn be the vector of state variables, c = (c1, . . . , cm) ∈ U ⊆ Rm the vector of control
(or decision) variables, u(x(s), c(s), s) the instantaneous utility function at time s, T the
planning horizon (terminal time) and F (x(T ), T ) the final or bequest function. Then the
corresponding intertemporal utility function is
Ut =
∫ T
t
e−ρ(s−t)u(x, c, s) ds+ e−ρ¯(T−t)F (x(T ), T ) . (1)
As we present in the Introduction, impatient agents over-valuing utilities u(x, c, s) in
comparison with the final function F (x(T ), T ) are characterized by ρ¯ > ρ (or δ > δ¯ in the
discrete time setting). However, with these time preferences, when time passes, the final
function increases its value in comparison with the utilities u(x, c, s). This asymmetric
valuation cannot be described by using a standard geometric discounting or, in general,
with hyperbolic preferences (with a unique non-constant discount rate). Note that with
(non)constant discounting the bias to the present (to their present) does not change from
the viewpoint of the different t-agents (in the hyperbolic discounting literature, an agent
taking decisions at time t is called the t-agent). With heterogeneous discounting, the bias
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to the present changes along time. We refer to Mar´ın-Solano and Patxot (2011) for a
discussion of this effect (in that paper heterogeneous discounting were used as an attempt
to describe, e.g., the behavior of an undergraduate student who is planning on how hard
to work in each of the years of her program).
Problems which can be represented by this model include consumption and portfolio
rule problems or retirement and pension problems. For instance, consider a decision-maker
who is planning on how much to save for her retirement. Typically, individuals are much
more concerned with life quality after retirement when retirement age is approaching1, in
comparison with their concern about their post retirement life when they look at it from
a long distance, for instance, when they are young. This saving effort can be viewed as
a disutility during the first periods, since the agent does not spend the saved resources
in consumption and hence in immediate gratification. Within this setting, let us briefly
compare the type of time-inconsistency for an impatient agent (say, agent A) with hyper-
bolic discounting (with a non-increasing discount rate) with the effects of impatience of
and agent with heterogeneous discounting with ρ¯ > ρ (agent B).
For agent A, the willingness to increase her final year’s saving effort in return for a
better retirement (and higher subsequent welfare) is higher at the beginning of the planning
horizon than at the end of the planning horizon, since she is always more impatient in
her short-run decisions than in her long-run decisions. For this reason, this agent would
like to commit herself, in the first year, to save harder in the final year, compared to her
actual willingness to make the saving effort when the final year arrives. In particular, if
this agent is naive (time-inconsistent), when the final year arrives, she actually ends up
saving less than she planned in the first year.
Next, we look at the behavior of agent B. For a long time horizon and from the first year
perspective, it is natural to assume that the agent can hardly imagine her post-retirement
life, so she decides to save an small amount of money. As the prospect of retirement
looms, she takes things more seriously and decides in the last year to save harder than she
planned at the beginning of her planning horizon. This is the effect that we can capture by
using a different instantaneous discount rates for instantaneous utilities and for the final
function. In order to see this effect, consider the case ρ¯ > ρ and rewrite the final function
in (1) as e−ρ(T−t)e−(ρ¯−ρ)(T−t)F (x(T ), T ). In this way, the actual valuation of the final
function of the agent is given by e−(ρ¯−ρ)(T−t)F (x(T ), T ), which is an increasing function
in t. Hence, as long as the agent approaches to the end of the planning horizon, the
current final function increases, i.e., e−(ρ¯−ρ)(T−s2)F (x(T ), T ) > e−(ρ¯−ρ)(T−s1)F (x(T ), T )
for s1 < s2, si ∈ (t, T ).
Summarizing, the main difference between agents A and B (or between hyperbolic
and heterogeneous discounting) is the time evolution of the bias to the present. An agent
taking decisions with hyperbolic preferences has always the same bias to her present, as
in the case of standard (exponential) discounting. On the contrary, for agent B (with
heterogeneous discounting), there is also a bias to the present, but this bias changes
(decreases when ρ < ρ¯) as long as she approaches the end of the planning horizon. If
ρ¯ > ρ the agent procrastinates (as in hyperbolic discounting), in the sense of undervaluing
the final function, but this procrastination decreases along time. With a similar argument,
in case that ρ > ρ¯, the agent will have a decreasing valuation of the final function as long
as she reaches the final time T .
We finish this section by introducing the problem in a stochastic setting. In the discrete
1Alternatively, we could think in an agent solving a consumption-portfolio rules problem where the final
function represents a bequest function for her descendants. The individual is much more concerned with
life quality of her descendants when she becomes older.
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time case, the difference equation is now subject to random disturbances and the state
equation becomes Xt+1 = f(Xt, ct, t, Vt+1), X0 = x0, V0 = v0. We restrict our attention
to the case when Vt+1 is a random variable taking values in a finite set V. Each t-agent
will look for maximizing in ct the expected intertemporal utility function
E
[
T−1∑
s=t
δs−tus(Xs, cs, s|xt, vt) + δ¯T−tF (XT , T |xt, vt)
]
(2)
subject to
Xs+1 = f(Xs, cs, s, Vs+1) , Xs = xs , Vs = vs , s = t, . . . , T − 1 . (3)
In continuous time, the problem becomes
maxE
[∫ T
t
e−ρ(s−t)u(X(s), c(s), s) + e−ρ¯(T−t)F (X(T ), T ) | xt
]
(4)
subject to
dX(s) = f(X(s), c(s), s)ds+ σ(X(s), c(s), s) · dW (s), X(t) = xt given . (5)
3 Dynamic programming equation
The solution provided by the use of standard optimal control techniques is time-inconsistent
if the intertemporal utility function takes the form (2) or (4). In Mar´ın-Solano and Patxot
(2011) a DPE for sophisticated (time-consistent) agents in a deterministic framework was
derived by following a variational approach. In this section we derive first a Dynamic Pro-
gramming Equation (DPE) for the stochastic problem in a discrete time setting. Next,
we obtain the DPE in continuous time by discretizing first the problem and defining then
the DPE as the (formal) continuous time limit. This derivation is similar to that in Karp
(2007) and Mar´ın-Solano and Navas (2010) for the case of non-constant discounting in de-
terministic and stochastic environments, respectively. Finally, we provide an alternative
derivation of the DPE by using a variational approach.
3.1 Dynamic Programming Equation in discrete time
First, let us assume that the probability that Vt+1 = v ∈ V, Pt(v|vt), may depend on the
outcome vt at time t, as well as explicitly on time t, but it is independent on the state and
control variables xt and ct. In addition, functions u and f are assumed to be continuous
in (x, c). We search for an equilibrium rule c∗t = φt(xt, vt), characterized by the property
that no decision-maker in the sequence of decision-makers wants to deviate from it. Let
T be finite. The value function for the t-agent is given by
W (xt, t, vt) = sup
{ct}
E
[
T−1∑
s=t
δs−tus(Xs, cs, s|xt, vt) + δ¯T−tF (XT , T |xt, vt)
]
(6)
where cs = φs(xs, vs), for s = t + 1, . . . , n. The computation of the expectation in (6) is
based on conditional probabilities of the form p∗(vt+1, . . . , vs) = Pt(vt+1| vt)·Pt+1(vt+2| vt+1)
· · ·Ps−1(vs| vs−1). We adapt the derivation of the DPE in the classical case δ = δ¯ (see e.g.
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Seierstad (2009)) as follows. In the final period T we define W (xT , T, vT ) = F (xT , T ) as
usual. At period T − 1,
W (xT−1, T − 1, vT−1) = sup
{cT−1}
{
E
[
uT−1(xT−1, cT−1, T − 1) + δ¯F (XT , T ) |xT−1, vT−1
]}
,
where the expectation is calculated over VT given vT−1. Since F (XT , T ) depends on VT
via XT = f(xT−1, cT−1, T − 1, VT ), we can write
W (xT−1, T − 1, vT−1) = uT−1(xT−1, φT−1(xT−1, vT−1), T − 1)+
+δ¯E [F (XT , T ) |xT−1, vT−1 ] = uT−1(xT−1, φT−1(xT−1, vT−1), T − 1) + δ¯LT−1T ,
where we define LT−1T = E [F (XT , T ) |xT−1, vT−1]. In general, if
Lsτ = E[· · · [E[E[u(Xτ , φτ (Xτ , τ), τ) |Xτ−1, Vτ−1] |Xτ−2, Vτ−2] · · · ] |xs, vs ] ,
it is clear that
W (xt, t, vt) = sup
{ct}
{
ut(xt, ct, t) +
T−1∑
s=t+1
δs−tLts + δ¯
T−tLtT
}
. (7)
In a similar way, W (xt+1, t+ 1, vt+1) =
∑T−1
s=t+1 δ
s−t−1Lt+1s + δ¯T−t−1L
t+1
T and therefore
E [W (Xt+1, t+ 1, Vt+1 |xt, vt) ] =
T−1∑
s=t+1
δs−t−1Lts + δ¯
T−t−1LtT . (8)
By solving LtT in (8) and substituting in (7) we obtain the Dynamic Programing Equation,
which proceeds backward in time:
W (xT , T, vT ) = F (xT , T ) ,
δ¯T−t−1W (xt, t, vt) = sup
{ct}
{
δ¯T−t−1ut(xt, ct, t) +
T−1∑
s=t+1
[
δs−tδ¯T−t−1 − δs−t−1δ¯T−t]Lts+
+δ¯T−tE [W (Xt+1, t+ 1, Vt+1 |xt, vt) ]
}
, (9)
Xs+1 = f(Xs, cs, s, Vs+1) , Xs = xs, Vs = vs .
The decision rules solving the right hand term in equation (9) are the Markov Perfect
Equilibria.
Remark 1 Note that, if the discount rates coincide, δ = δ¯, the term in the sum in (9)
vanishes and we recover the standard Bellman equation.
We can easily extend our previous results to the case when Pt[Vt+1 = v] = Pt(v|xt, ct, vt)
depends, not only on time t and the previous outcome vt, but also on the state and control
variables xt and ct. We present the details in the Appendix.
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3.2 The continuous time case: a formal limiting procedure
Now, let us extend the DPE (9) to a continuous time setting, by following a formal limiting
procedure as in Karp (2007) and Mar´ın-Solano and Navas (2010). In the continuous time
setting, the agent at time t (the t-agent) aims to solve Problem 4-5. Let us discretize
the problem by following the classical Euler (or Euler-Mayurama) method. If we divide
the interval [0, T ] into N periods of constant length , in such a way that we identify
T = N, and s = j, for j = 0, 1, . . . , N , then Equation (5) becomes X(t + 1) = X(t) +
f(X(t), c(t), t)+σ(X(t), c(t), t)(w(t+1)−w(t)) where w(t) is a Wiener process. Denoting
X(j) = Xj and c(j) = cj , for j = 0, . . . , N − 1, the objective of the agent in period
t = j is to maximize
E
N−1∑
s=j
e−ρ(s−j)u(Xs, cs, s) + e−ρ¯(N−j)F (XT , T )
 (10)
subject to
Xi+1 = Xi + f(Xi, ci, i) + σ(Xi, ci, i)(wi+1 − wi) , (11)
for i = j, . . . , T − 1, xj given. Note that Problem 10-11 is equivalent to Problem 2-3.
Remark 2 For a given decision rule c(x, s), a condition assuring the uniform convergence
(in the mean square sense) of the solution of the discretized equation (11) to the true
solution to (5) is that functions f and σ satisfy uniform growth and Lipschitz conditions
in x, and are Ho¨lder continuous of order 1/2 in the second variable.
Definition 1 We define the value function V (x, t) for Problem (4-5) as the solution to
the DPE obtained by taking the formal continuous time limit when → 0 of the DPE (9)
obtained for the discrete approximation (10-11) to the problem, assuming that such a limit
exists and that the solution is of class C2,1.
Next, let us derive the DPE for the problem with heterogeneous discounting in the
spirit of the previous definition. Let V (x, t) be the value function of the t-agent, with initial
condition x(t) = xt. Since s = j andX(t+) = x(t)+f(x(t), c(t), t)+σ(x(t), c(t), t)(w(t+
)− w(t)) , then W (xj , j, vj) = V (xt, t) and
V (xt+, t+ ) = V (xt, t) +∇xtV (xt, t)f(xt, c(t), t)+∇xtV (xt, t)σ(x, c(t), t) · (wt+−wt)+
+∇tV (xt, t)+ 1
2
tr
(
σ(xt, c(t), t) · σ′(xt, c(t), t) · ∇xtxtV (xt, t)
)
+ o()
where lim→0
o()
 = 0. In addition, e
−ρ¯(n−j) = e−ρ¯(n−j−1) [1− ρ¯+ o()] and e−ρk =
e−ρ(k−1) [1− ρ+ o()]. By substituting in (9) we obtain
V (xt, t) = sup
{ct}
{u(xt, ct, t)+
n−1∑
k=j+1
[
e−ρ(k−j−1)(ρ¯− ρ)
]
Ljk +
+V (xt, t) +∇xtV (xt, t)f(xt, ct, t)+E [∇xtV (xt, t)σ(xt, ct, t) · (wt+ − wt)] +∇tV (xt, t)+
+
1
2
tr
(
σ(xt, ct, t) · σ′(xt, ct, t) · ∇xtxtV (xt, t)
)
−
−ρV (xt, t)− ρE [∇xtV (xt, t)σ(xt, v, t)(wt+ − wt)] + o()} .
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Therefore,
0 = sup
{ct}
{u(xt, ct, t)+
n−1∑
k=j+1
[
e−ρ(k−j−1)(ρ¯− ρ)
]
Ljk +∇xtV (xt, t)f(xt, ct, t)+
+∇tV (xt, t)+ 1
2
tr
(
σ(xt, ct, t) · σ′(xt, ct, t) · ∇xtxtV (xt, t)
)
− ρV (xt, t) + o()
}
. (12)
Dividing equation (12) by  and taking the limit → 0 we obtain:
Proposition 1 Let V (x, t) be a function of class C2,1 in (x, t) satisfying the DPE
ρ¯V (x, t)−∇tV (x, t)−K(x, t) = (13)
= sup
{c}
{
u(x, c, t) +∇xV (x, t)f(x, c, t) + 1
2
tr
(
σ(x, c, t) · σ′(x, c, t) · ∇xxV (x, t)
)}
,
with
V (x, T ) = F (x, T ) , (14)
and
K(x, t) = (ρ¯− ρ)E
[∫ T
t
e−ρ(s−t)u(Xs, φ(Xs, s), s) ds
]
. (15)
Then V (x, t) is the value function for Problem 4-5. If, for each pair (x, t), there exists a
decision rule c∗ = φ(x, t), with corresponding state trajectory X∗(t), such that c∗ maximizes
the right hand side term of (13), then c∗ = φ(x, t) is called a Markov equilibrium rule for
the problem with heterogeneous discounting.
Remark 3 Again, if ρ = ρ¯, the term K(x, t) vanishes and we recover the standard
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation.
In the proof of the previous proposition the pass to the limit is “formal” and needs
to be mathematically justified. With respect to the classical DPE, in Fleming and Soner
(2006) the convergence of finite difference approximations to Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman
equations is discussed. We refer also to Kushner and Dupuis (2001) for a study of the
convergence of numerical methods to the value function in the standard case.
Finally, note that we can write
K(x, t) = (ρ¯− ρ)E
[∫ T
t
e−ρ(s−t)u(X(s), φ(X(s), s), s) ds
]
(16)
and, by differentiating K in (16) with respect to t we obtain the “auxiliary dynamic
programming equation”
ρK(x, t)−∇tK(x, t) = (ρ¯− ρ)u(x, φ(x, t), t) +∇xK(x, t) · f(x, φ(x, t), t)+
+
1
2
tr
(
σ(x, φ(x, t), t) · σ′(x, φ(x, t), t) · ∇xxK(x, t)
)
. (17)
Hence we have:
Corollary 1 Let V (x, t) and K(x, t) be two functions of class C2,1 in (x, t) such that
V (x, t), K(x, t) and the strategy c∗ = φ(x, t) satisfy the set of two DPEs (13) and (17)
with boundary conditions V (x, T ) = F (x, T ), K(x, T ) = 0. Then V (x, t) is the value
function for Problem (4-5), and the strategy c∗ = φ(x, t) maximizing the right hand side
term of Equation (13) is a Markov equilibrium rule for the problem with heterogeneous
discounting.
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3.3 Dynamic programming equation in continuous time: a variational
approach
Next we provide an alternative derivation of the DPE (13-15), by using a variational
approach similar to that introduced, for the case of non-constant discounting, in Ekeland
and Pirvu (2008). In particular, we extend to a stochastic setting the derivation of a DPE
in the deterministic problem with heterogeneous discounting first derived in Mar´ın-Solano
and Patxot (2011). To do that we assume that decision rules are progressively measurable
processes such that the stochastic differential equation (5) admits a unique strong solution
(see e.g. Theorem 6.3 in Yong and Zhou (1999) for conditions for the existence of strong
solutions). For the problem analyzed in Section 4, described by a linear SDE, the existence
of strong unique solutions is guaranteed.
Equilibrium policies are defined as follows. If c∗(s) = φ(X(s), s) is the equilibrium
rule, for  > 0 let us consider the variations
c(s) =
{
v(s) if s ∈ [t, t+ ] ,
φ(X, s) if s > t+  .
If the t-agent can precommit her behavior during the period [t, t + ], the value function
for the perturbed control path c is given by
V(x, t) = max{v(s), s∈[t,t+]}
E
[∫ t+
t
e−ρ(s−t)u(X(s), v(s), s) ds+
+
∫ T
t+
e−ρ(s−t)u(X(s), φ(X(s), s), s) ds+ e−ρ¯(T−t)F (X(T ), T )
]
.
Definition 2 Let V(x, t) be differentiable in  in a neighbourhood of  = 0. Then c
∗(s) =
φ(x(s), s) is called an equilibrium rule if
lim
→0+
V (x, t)− V(x, t)

≥ 0 .
The definition above can be interpreted as follows. For  sufficiently small, from the
continuity of V with respect to , the maximum of V in the limit when  = 0 is V (x, t).
Proposition 2 If the value function is of class C2,1, then the solution c = φ(X, t) to the
right hand term of the DPE (13-15) is an equilibrium rule, in the sense that it satisfies
Definition 2.
Proof: See the Appendix.
Remark 4 In Mar´ın-Solano and Shevkoplyas (2011) a DPE characterizing time-consistent
solutions was derived for the general problem of mazimizing
∫ T
t d(s, t)u(x(s), c(s), s) ds +
d(T, t)F (x(T ), T ) in a deterministic setting, where d(s, t) is an arbitrary discount function.
For this problem, the following DPE for time-consistent equilibria was obtained:
∂d(T, t)
∂t
V (x, t) +
∫ T
t
[
d(T, t)
∂d(s, t)
∂t
− d(s, t)∂d(T, t)
∂t
]
u(x(s), σ(x(s), s), s)ds−
−d(T, t)∂V (x, t)
∂t
= d(T, t) max
{c}
[
u(x, c, t) +
∂V (x, t)
∂x
· f(x, c, t)
]
.
If we extend the proof in Mar´ın-Solano and Shevkoplyas (2011) to the stochastic case, we
have just to add the expectation operator in the integral term in the equation above, and the
standard second order term 12 tr(σ(x, c, t) · σ′(x, c, t) · ∇xxV (x, t)) in the right hand term.
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4 An investment-consumption model with heterogeneous
discounting
In this section, we apply the results in the previous section in order to analyze which are
the effects of introducing different discount rates for utilities obtained, in an investment-
consumption problem, from consumption enjoyed along time and from bequest. We obtain
the equilibrium consumption and portfolio rules for this modified version of the classical
Merton’s model (Merton (1971)).
The financial market consists of 2 securities. One of them is risk-free (a cash account,
for instance), and the price P0(t) of one unit is assumed to evolve according to the ordinary
differential equation dP0(t)P0(t) = µ0 dt, where P0(0) = p0 > 0 and µ0 > 0 accounts for the
return on the sure asset. There is also a risky security whose price P1(t) evolves according
to dP1(t)P1(t) = µ1 dt + σ dz, where P1(0) = p1 > 0, µ1 is the expected percentage change
in price per unit time and z(t) is a standard Brownian motion process. The agent can
invest a proportion w(t) of her wealth at time t, W (t), in the risky asset and a proportion
(1 − w(t)) in the risk free asset. In addition the agent can allocate an amount of c(t) to
consumption. The consumer’s wealth process evolves according to
dW (t) = [w(t)(µ1 − µ0)W (t) + (µ0W (t)− c(t))] dt+ w(t)σW (t)dz(t) , (18)
with W (0) = W0. The objective of the agent at time t is to choose the consumption and
investment strategies, c(s), w(s), s ∈ [t, T ], in order to maximize
E
[∫ T
t
e−ρ(s−t)u(c(s))ds+ e−ρ¯(T−t)F (W (T ))
]
(19)
subject to (18), given W (t) = Wt. Both the utility function u(·) and the bequest function
F (·) are assumed to be strictly concave functions on their arguments2.
If the agent can commit herself to follow in the future the “optimal” solution obtained
from the viewpoint of her preferences at time t = 0, she will solve the classical Hamilton-
Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation
ρV 0 − ∂V
0
∂s
= max
{c,w}
{
u(c) + [w(µ1 − µ0)W + (µ0W − c)] ∂V
0
∂W
+
1
2
w2σ2W 2
∂2V 0
∂W 2
}
, (20)
where V 0(W, s) denotes the current value function. The “optimal” controls are the solution
to
u′(c(s)) =
∂V 0
∂W
, w(s) = −(µ1 − µ0)
σ2
[
∂V 0
∂W
W ∂
2V 0
∂W 2
]
. (21)
Both the HJB equation (20) and the decision rules (21) do not depend explicitly on the
new discount rate ρ¯. The difference with the standard problem with a unique discount
rate appears via the final condition. Note that we can write the bequest function as
e−ρ¯TF (W (T ), T ) = e−ρT e−(ρ¯−ρ)TF (W (T ), T ). Hence, in the current value formulation,
the terminal condition to be imposed in (20) is now
V 0(W,T ) = e−(ρ¯−ρ)TF (W ) . (22)
If ρ = ρ¯ we recover the classical solution, which is time consistent. Otherwise, if the agent
can not precommit her future actions, she will be time-inconsistent. Note that, if V t(W, s),
2The extension to the problem with an arbitrary number of risky assets is straightforward.
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s ∈ [t, T ], denotes the current value function at time t according to the time-preferences
of the t-agent, she will look for the solution to the classical HJB equation
ρV t − ∂V
t
∂s
= max
{c,w}
{
u(c) + [w(µ1 − µ0)W + (µ0W − c)] ∂V
t
∂W
+
1
2
w2σ2W 2
∂2V t
∂W 2
}
(23)
with the boundary condition
V t(W,T ) = e−(ρ¯−ρ)(T−t)F (W ) . (24)
At different initial times t ∈ [0, T ] the agent has to solve the same HJB equation (23)
but she applies a different terminal condition (24). In general, if the agent does not
commit her decision rule at any time t, and does not take into account that her time
preferences will change in the future, she will be continuously modifying her choices. This
kind of extremely time-inconsistent behavior is usually referred to as the naive behavior
or the naive solution in the non-constant discounting literature. In order to obtain time
consistent solutions we must solve the DPE (13-15). We will do it for the family of CRRA
(power and logarithmic) and CARA (exponential) utility functions.
4.1 Power utility function
Let us study the problem for the case of power utilities, u(c) = c
γ
γ and F (W (T )) =
W (T )γ
γ ,
with γ < 1, γ 6= 0.
First we briefly derive the time-inconsistent (naive) solution. The “optimal solution”
according to the time preferences of the t-agent can be obtained by solving the HJB
equation (23) with the boundary condition (24). It is easy to prove that, in this case, the
value function is given by V t(W, s) = αt(s)W (s)
γ
γ , where
αt(s) =
[
1− γ
ςt
+
(
e
1
γ−1 (ρ¯−ρ)(T−t) − 1− γ
ςt
)
e
ςt
γ−1 (T−s)
]1−γ
with
ςt = ρ− µ0γ + 1
2
γ(µ1 − µ0)2
σ2(γ − 1) .
The corresponding consumption and investment rules are ct(s) = (αt(s))
1
γ−1W , wt(s) =
−(µ1−µ0)
σ2(γ−1) .
In particular, if the agent can precommit her decision rule at time t = 0, we obtain
the precommitment solution, characterized by
αP (s) =
[
1− γ
ς
+
(
e
1
γ−1 (ρ¯−ρ)T − 1− γ
ς
)
e
ς
γ−1 (T−s)
]1−γ
. (25)
Otherwise, if the agent is naive, since the naive t-agent follows her decision rule just at
time s = t, her actual consumption rule can be obtained by taking s = t, so
αN (t) =
[
1− γ
ςN
+
(
e
1
γ−1 (ρ¯−ρ)(T−t) − 1− γ
ςN
)
e
ςN
γ−1 (T−t)
]1−γ
.
In order to obtain a time-consistent solution, according to Proposition 1, Markov
equilibria can be obtained by solving the DPE
ρ¯V S(W, t)−K(W, t)− V St (W, t) =
13
max
{c,w}
{u(c) + [w(µ1 − µ0)W + (µ0W − c)]V SW (W, t) +
1
2
w2σ2W 2V SWW (W, t)} , (26)
with K(W, t) given by
K(W, t) = E
[∫ T
t
e−ρ(s−t)(ρ¯− ρ)u(φ(W, s))ds
]
, (27)
where c∗ = φ(W, s) is the equilibrium consumption rule obtained by solving the right
hand term in (26). In particular, if we apply Corollary 1, we obtain the set of two coupled
partial differential equations
ρ¯V S(W, t)−K(W, t)− V St (W, t) =
max
{c,w}
{
cγ
γ
+ [w(µ1 − µ0)W + (µ0W − c)]V SW (W, t) +
1
2
w2σ2W 2V SWW (W, t)
}
, (28)
ρK(W, t)−Kt(W, t) =
(ρ¯− ρ)c
∗γ
γ
+
[
w(µ1 − µ0)W + (µ0W − c+)
]
KW (W, t) +
1
2
w2σ2W 2KWW (W, t) . (29)
As a candidate to the value function we guess V S(W, t) = αS(t)W (t)
γ
γ and K(W, t) =
A(t)W (t)
γ
γ . We easily obtain c
∗ = (α(t)S)
1
γ−1W , w∗ = −(µ1−µ0)
σ2(γ−1) .
Then by substituting in (28-29) and collecting terms in W (t)γ , we obtain that functions
A(t) and αS(t) are the solution to the following system of ordinary differential equations:
ρ
1
γ
A(t)− 1
γ
A˙(t) = (ρ¯−ρ) 1
γ
(αS(t))
γ
γ−1−A(t)1
2
(µ1 − µ0)2
σ2(γ − 1) +A(t)µ0−(α
S(t))
1
γ−1A(t) , (30)
ρ¯
1
γ
αS(t)− 1
γ
α˙S(t)− 1
γ
A(t) =
1
γ
(αS(t))
γ
γ−1 − αS(t)1
2
(µ1 − µ0)2
σ2(γ − 1) + α
S(t)µ0 − (αS(t))
γ
γ−1 .
(31)
Table 1 summarizes the results obtained for the power utility for the different behaviors
of the agent: precommitment, naive or time-consistent. The results for the particular case
in the limit γ = 0 (logarithmic utility) are presented in Table 2.
Consumption rule Portfolio rule
cP (t) = Wt
1−γ
ς
+
(
e
1
γ−1 (ρ¯−ρ)T− 1−γ
ς
)
e
ς
γ−1 (T−s)
wP = µ1−µ0
(1−γ)σ2
cN (t) = Wt
1−γ
ςN
+
(
e
1
γ−1 (ρ¯−ρ)(T−t)− 1−γ
ςN
)
e
ςN
γ−1 (T−t)
wN = µ1−µ0
(1−γ)σ2
cS(t) =
(
α(t)S
) 1
1−γ Wt, α
S(t) given by (30-31) wS = µ1−µ0
(1−γ)σ2
Table 1: Power utility function.
It is interesting to observe that, in the case of logarithmic utility functions u(c) = ln(c)
and F (W (T )) = ln(W (T )), the naive solution is time-consistent, since it verifies the
corresponding DPE. This result is similar to that described in Mar´ın-Solano and Navas
(2010) for the case of non-constant discounting (or hyperbolic preferences).
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Consumption rule Portfolio rule
cP (t) = Wt
e−ρ¯T+ρt+ 1
ρ [1−e−ρ(T−t)]
wP = µ1−µ0
σ2
cN (t) = Wt
e−ρ¯(T−t)+ 1
ρ [1−e−ρ(T−t)]
wN = µ1−µ0
σ2
cS(t) = Wt
e−ρ¯(T−t)+ 1
ρ [1−e−ρ(T−t)]
wS = µ1−µ0
σ2
Table 2: Logarithmic utility function.
Next we illustrate numerically the above results. In all the figures we consider the
following values for the main parameters: T = 30, γ = −3, W0 = 1000, µ0 = 0.03,
µ1 = 0.09 and σ = 0.3.
In Figure 1 we compare the consumption rules for the precommitment, naive and time-
consistent (sophisticated) solutions. The discount rates are ρ = 0.03 (for instantaneous
utilities) and ρ¯ = 0.12 (for the bequest function). Note that, for t small, the three solutions
are quite similar. However, when time t approaches to the final time T = 30, the three
solutions become different. The naive and time-consistent solutions indicate how the time
preferences evolve along time, in comparison with the precommitment solution, which does
not take into account the changing preferences.
Figure 1: Precommitment (Dashed large), naive (Dashed small) and time-consistent solu-
tions (black)
Table 3 represents the values of consumption for several values of time t. The precom-
mitment and naive solutions coincide just at the initial time and, later on, consumption
increases faster in the precommitment solution than in the other solution. Time-consistent
agents consume less at the beginning and, at the middle of the time horizon, they begin
to consume more than naive agents.
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t cP (t) cN (t) cS(t)
0 52.2425 52.2425 51.9128
1 53.8335 53.8153 53.4908
2 55.473 55.4341 55.1163
3 57.1624 57.0998 56.7907
... ... ... ...
10 70.52 70.1727 69.9935
11 72.6676 72.2548 72.1075
12 74.8807 74.3934 74.2824
13 77.1611 76.589 76.519
14 79.511 78.8422 78.8184
15 81.9325 81.1533 81.1811
16 84.4277 83.5222 83.6076
17 86.9989 85.9484 86.0977
18 89.6484 88.431 88.6509
19 92.3786 90.9685 91.2658
20 95.192 93.5582 93.94
... ... ... ...
27 117.436 112.448 113.56
28 121.013 114.955 116.156
29 124.698 117.159 118.424
30 128.496 118.675 119.968
Table 3: Comparison of solutions.
Next, in Figure 2 we analyze the sensibility of the time-consistent solution for different
values of ρ¯. For ρ = 0.03 we take ρ¯1 = 0.03 (standard case), ρ¯2 = 0.10, ρ¯3 = 0.15 and
ρ¯4 = 0.20.
Figure 2: Standard case (Dashing large). ρ¯2 = 0.10 (DotDashed). ρ¯3 = 0.15 (Dashing
small). ρ¯4 = 0.20 (Black).
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Finally, Figure 3 illustrates the sensibility of consumption in the time-consistent solu-
tion for different values of the risk aversion γ.
Figure 3: γ = −1 (Dashing large). γ = −2 (DotDashed). γ = −5 (Dashing small).
γ = −8 (Black).
4.2 Exponential utility function
Now, let us solve the problem for the (constant absolute risk aversion) exponential utility
function u(c) = − 1γ e−γc, γ > 0, with final function F (W (T )) = −ae−γW ,
max
{c,w}
E
[∫ T
t
e−ρ(s−t)
−1
γ
e−γcds+ e−ρ¯(T−t)(−ae−γW (T ))
]
subject to (18) with initial condition W (t) = Wt. Once again, we first derive the
precommitment and naive solutions. A (time-inconsistent) t-agent looks for the solu-
tion to the HJB equation (23) with the utility function specified above. By guessing
V t(W, s) = −ae−γ(αt(s)+βt(s)W ), the consumption and portfolio rules are given by
ct(s) = αt(s) + βt(s)W − ln(aγβ
t(s))
γ
, wt(s) =
(µ1 − µ0)
σ2γβt(s)W
. (32)
We substitute (32) in (23) to obtain that αt(s) and βt(s) must satisfy
α˙t − αtβt = β
t
γ
− ρ
γ
− 1
2
(µ1 − µ0)2
σ2γ
− β
t
γ
ln(aγβt) , (33)
β˙t = (βt)2 − µ0βt , (34)
together with the terminal conditions αt(T ) = 1γ (ρ¯ − ρ)(T − t), βt(T ) = 1, respectively.
The solution to the Bernoulli differential equation (34) is
βt(s) =
µ0
1 + (µ0 − 1)e−µ0(T−s)
.
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Note that the function βt(s) does not depend on t. Hence, the value of β(s) for both,
the 0-agent under commitment and the naive t-agent, coincides for all s ∈ [0, T ], i.e.
β(s) = β0(s) = βN (s). By substituting the value of βt(s) in equation (33) we find that
αt(s) =
1
γ
e−
∫ T
s β(τ)dτ
[
(ρ¯− ρ)(T − t)−
∫ T
s
υe(τ)e
∫ T
τ β(z)dzdτ
]
,
where
υe(τ) = β(τ)− 1
2
(µ1 − µ0)2
σ2
− β(τ) ln(aγβ(τ))− ρ .
Taking t = 0 and s = t we obtain the precommitment and naive solutions, respectively,
αP (s) = α0(s) =
1
γ
e−
∫ T
s β(τ)dτ
[
(ρ¯− ρ)T −
∫ T
s
υe(τ)e
∫ T
τ β(z)dzdτ
]
,
αN (s) =
1
γ
e−
∫ T
s β(τ)dτ
[
(ρ¯− ρ)(T − s)−
∫ T
s
υe(τ)e
∫ T
τ β(z)dzdτ
]
.
Finally, let us compute the time consistent equilibrium which, according to Proposition
1, can be obtained by solving the DPE
ρ¯V S(W, t)−K(W, t)− V St (W, t) =
max
{c,w}
{−1
γ
e−γc + [w(µ1 − µ0)W + (µ0W − c)]V SW (W, t) +
1
2
w2σ2W 2V SWW (W, t)
}
,
with K(W, t) given by
K(W, t) = E
[∫ T
t
e−ρ(s−t)(ρ¯− ρ)−1
γ
e−γc
∗
ds
]
.
Applying Collorary 1 we obtain the set of two coupled partial differential equations
ρ¯V S(W, t)−K(W, t)− V St (W, t) =
max
{c,w}
{−1
γ
e−γc + [w(µ1 − µ0)W + (µ0W − c)]V SW (W, t) +
1
2
w2σ2W 2V SWW (W, t)
}
, (35)
ρK(W, t)−Kt(W, t) =
(ρ¯− ρ)−1
γ
e−γc
∗
+ [w(µ1 − µ0)W + (µ0W − c)]KW (W, t) + 1
2
w2σ2W 2KWW (W, t) , (36)
where c∗ is the maximizer of the right hand term in (35). As a candidate to the value
function we guess V S(W, t) = −ae−γ(αS(t)+βS(t)W ) and K(W, t) = A(t)e−γ(αS(t)+βS(t)W ).
If these choices prove to be consistent the consumption and portfolio rules are
c∗ = αS(t) + βS(t)W − ln(aγβ
S(t))
γ
, w∗ =
(µ1 − µ0)
σ2γβS(t)W
. (37)
Next, it is not difficult to check that βS(t) coincides with β(t). By substituting (37) in
(35-36) we obtain that functions αS(t) and A(t) are the solution to the following system
of ordinary differential equations:
ρA(t)− A˙(t) + γA(t)α˙S(t) =
18
−a(ρ¯− ρ)βS(t)−
[
(µ1 − µ0)2
σ2γβS(t)
− αS(t) + ln(aγβ
S(t))
γ
]
γA(t)βS(t) +
1
2
(µ1 − µ0)2
σ2
A(t) ,
ρ¯a+ aγα˙S(t) +A(t) =
aβS(t)−
[
(µ1 − µ0)2
σ2γβS(t)
− αS(t) + ln(aγβ
S(t))
γ
]
γaβS(t) +
1
2
(µ1 − µ0)2
σ2
a .
In Figure 4 and Figure 5 we analyze the sensibility of the time-consistent consumption
and portfolio rules, respectively, for different values of ρ¯. For ρ = 0.3 we take ρ¯1 = 0.03
(standard case), ρ¯2 = 0.10, ρ¯3 = 0.15 and ρ¯4 = 0.20. The values for the others parameters
are: T = 30, γ = 0.1, W0 = 1000, µ0 = 0.03, µ1 = 0.09 and σ = 0.3.
Figure 4: Standard case (Dashing large). ρ¯2 = 0.10 (DotDashed). ρ¯3 = 0.15 (Dashing
small). ρ¯4 = 0.20 (Black).
Figure 5: Standard case (Dashing large). ρ¯2 = 0.10 (DotDashed). ρ¯3 = 0.15 (Dashing
small). ρ¯4 = 0.20 (Black).
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Finally, let us briefly compare the results corresponding to the investment strategy
according to the precommitment, naive and time-consistent solutions. In the case of power
utilities, we have proved that the portfolio rule is always the same for these three solutions
(although the consumption rule differs, as expected). For the case of exponential utilities,
the investment rule is calculated according to the same formula w∗ = µ1−µ0
σ2γβ(t)W
, where β(t)
coincides for all the solution concepts. However, since w∗ depends on W , and W evolves
in a different way for precommitment, naive and time-consistent agents, the coincidence of
portfolio rules in the power utility case is lost in the case of (CARA) exponential utilities.
5 The case of stochastic terminal time
Finally, let us assume that the final time T is a random variable taking values in [t0, T¯ ]
(T¯ can be finite or infinite) with a known (maybe subjective) distribution function G(τ)
and finite expectation. For instance, in the case of uncertain lifetime presented by Yaari
(1965), the distribution function Gt(s) is the conditional probability that a consumer
will die before time s, given that she is alive at time t, for t < s. Let us assume that
G(τ) has density function, G′(τ) = g(τ). The conditional distribution function satisfies
Gt(τ) =
G(τ)−G(t)
1−G(t) and gt(τ) =
dGt(τ)
dτ =
g(τ)
1−G(t) . Under heterogeneous discounting and
random duration the t-agent will look for maximizing the expected value of (4), i.e.,
E
[∫ T
t
e−ρ(s−t)u(X(s), c(s), s) + e−ρ¯(T−t)F (X(T ), T ) | xt , t ; T > t
]
=
E
[∫ T¯
t
dGt(τ)
[∫ τ
t
ds e−ρ(s−t)U(X(s), c(s), s)
]
+
∫ T¯
t
dGt(τ)e
−ρ¯(τ−t)F (X(τ), τ) | xt
]
=
E
[∫ T¯
t
[
e−ρ(s−t)(1−Gt(s))U(X(s), c(s), s) + e−ρ¯(s−t)gt(s)F (X(s), s)
]
ds | xt
]
. (38)
For the problem of maximizing (38) subject to (5), we can easily derive the correspond-
ing dynamic programming equation by reproducing the steps in Section 3. Let c∗(s) =
φ(x(s), s) an equilibrium rule, and assume that functions V1(x, t), V2(x, t) given by
V1(x, t) = E
[∫ T¯
t
e−ρ(s−t)(1−G(s))U(X(s), φ(X(s), s) ds | xt
]
,
V2(x, t) = E
[∫ T¯
t
e−ρ¯(s−t)g(s)F (X(s), s) ds | xt
]
are of class C2,1 in (x, t). Then the solution to the DPE
−
2∑
i=1
∂Vi(x, t)
∂t
+ ρV1(x, t) + ρ¯V2(x, t) = max{c}
{(1−G(t))U(x, c, t) + g(t)F (x, t)+
+
2∑
i=1
[
∇xVi(x, t) · f(x, c, t) + 1
2
tr
(
σ(x, c, t) · σ′(x, c, t) · ∇xxVi(x, t)
)]}
. (39)
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is an equilibrium policy. Note that, in addition, V1 and V2 verify the following partial
differential equations system:
−∂V1(x, t)
∂t
+ ρV1(x, t) = (1−G(t))U(x, φ(x, t), t) +∇xV1(x, t) · f(x, φ(x, t), t)+
+
1
2
tr
[
σ(x, φ(x, t), t) · σ′(x, φ(x, t), t) · ∇xxV1(x, t)
]
, (40)
−∂V2(x, t)
∂t
+ ρ¯V2(x, t) = g(t)F (x, t) +∇xV2(x, t) · f(x, φ(x, t), t)+
+
1
2
tr
[
σ(x, φ(x, t), t) · σ′(x, φ(x, t), t) · ∇xxV2(x, t)
]
. (41)
Consider, for instance, the saving-consumption problem of maximizing (19), where T
is a random variable taking values in [0,∞), subject to (18), with µ1 = σ = 0 (there is just
one risk-free asset). In the log-utility case, U(c) = ln c, F (W ) = a lnW , by maximizing
the right hand term in (39) we obtain the consumption rule
c∗(x, t) =
1−G(t)
∇WV1(W, t) +∇WV2(W, t) .
By substituting in (40) and (41) and by guessing V1(W, t) = α(t) lnW + β(t), V2(W, t) =
γ(t) lnW + δ(t), we obtain that α(t), β(t), γ(t) and δ(t) are the solution to the system of
coupled nonlinear differential equations
ρα(t)− α˙(t) = ln 1−G(t)
α(t) + γ(t)
,
ρβ(t)− β˙(t) = (1−G(t))ln 1−G(t)
α(t) + γ(t)
+ α(t)
(
µ0 − 1−G(t)
α(t) + γ(t)
)
,
ρ¯γ(t)− γ˙(t) = ag(t) ,
ρ¯δ(t)− δ˙(t) = γ(t)
(
µ0 − 1−G(t)
α(t) + γ(t)
)
.
6 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have extended the heterogeneous discounting framework introduced in
Mar´ın-Solano and Patxot (2011) to a stochastic environment, both in a discrete and in a
continuous time setting, characterizing time consistent optimal policies as the solution of
a system of two coupled partial differential equations. This procedure allows us to obtain
the solutions in an easier way than the equivalent but different approach there used, where
time consistent policies were associated with the solution of a functional equation as in
our Proposition 1.
By discounting differently the instantaneous payoffs and the final function, we can cap-
ture a changing (increasing or decreasing) relative valuation of the final function as long
as the agent approaches the end of the planning horizon. In our opinion, there are several
problems that seem to be good candidates for incorporating this feature as, for instance,
human capital formation or consumption and portfolio rules where the final function ac-
counts for a retirement plan or inheritance for descendants. Then, in order to illustrate
the usefulness of our approach, we obtain the time consistent optimal consumption and
portfolio rules for an extension of the classical Merton’s model with a decision maker with
heterogeneous time preferences and power and exponential utility. Finally, a discussion
on the general problem with an uncertain time is briefly analyzed.
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7 Appendix
DPE in discrete time: general case. Let us assume that the probabilities Pt[Vt+1 =
v] = Pt(v|xt, ct, vt) depend, not only on time t and the previous outcome vt, but also on the
state and control variables xt and ct. Given the policies c0(x0, v0), . . . , cT (xT , vT ), the state
Xs depends on the outcomes V1, . . . , Vs, i.e., Xs = Xs(V1, . . . , Vs). If p
∗(v1, . . . , vt) denotes
the probability of the joint event V1 = v1, . . . , Vt = vt, then the expectation in (2) becomes∑n−1
s=t
∑
vt,...,vs
δs−tus(Xs, cs(Xs, Vs), s)p∗(vt, . . . , vs)+
∑
vt,...,vT
δ¯T−tF (XT , T )p∗(vt, . . . , vT ).
Since the probabilities p∗(vt, . . . , vs), and hence the expected value, depend on the policies
chosen, we can denote the above expectation as Ect,...,cT . We define the value function
W (xt, t, vt) = sup
{ct}
Ect,...,cT
[
T−1∑
s=t
δs−tus(Xs, cs, s) + δ¯T−tF (XT , T ) |xt, vt
]
,
where the supremum is taken over the policy ct = ct(xt, vt), provided that future s-agents
follow the equilibrium rule c∗s = φs(xs, vs), for s = t+ 1, . . . , n. In the final period T , the
value function is W (xT , T, vT ) = F (XT , T ). For s ≥ τ , we define
Lτs =
∑
vτ+1
· · ·
∑
vs
Pτ (vτ+1|xτ , c∗τ , vτ ) · · ·Ps−1(vs|xs−1, c∗s−1, vs−1)us(Xs, φs(Xs, Vs), s) .
(42)
For s = T − 1 we have W (xT−1, T − 1, vT−1) = sup{cT−1}{uT−1(xT−1, cT−1, T − 1) +
EcT−1 δ¯F (XT , T )|xT−1, vT−1]}. Let c∗T−1 = φ(xT−1, vT−1) be the solution to this equation.
Since EcT−1 [F (XT )|xT−1, vT−1] =
∑
vT ∈V PT−1(vT |xT−1, c∗T−1, vT−1)F (XT , T ), then
W (xT−1, T−1, vT−1) = uT−1(xT−1, φ(xT−1, vT−1), T−1)+ δ¯
∑
vT ∈V PT−1(vT |xT−1, c∗T−1,
vT−1)F (XT , T ) = uT−1(xT−1, φ(xT−1, vT−1), T − 1) + δ¯LT−1T . In general W (xt+1, t +
1, vt+1) =
∑T−1
s=t+1 δ
s−t−1Lt+1s + δ¯T−t−1L
t+1
T and
W (xt, t, vt) = sup
{ct}
{
ut(xt, ct, t) +
T−1∑
s=t+1
δs−tEct
[
Lt+1s |xt, vt
]
+ δ¯T−tEct
[
Lt+1n |xt, vt
]}
=
= sup
{ct}
{ut(xt, ct, t) +
T−1∑
s=t+1
δs−tLts + δ¯
T−tLtT } . (43)
Taking the expectation of W (xt+1, t+ 1, Vt+1) conditioned to xt and vt we have
Ect [W (Xt+1, t+ 1, Vt+1) |xt, vt ] =
T−1∑
s=t+1
δs−t−1Lts + δ¯
T−t−1LtT . (44)
Finally, solving LtT in (44) and substituting in (43) we obtain the DPE (9).

Proof of Proposition 2. It is a rather straightforward extension of the proof in the
deterministic case (see Mar´ın-Solano and Patxot (2011)). We include a sketch of the
proof.
First note that, if x¯(s) is the state trajectory corresponding to the decision rule c(s),
then V (x, t) − V(x, t) = E
[∫ t+
t e
−ρ(s−t) [u(X(s), φ(X(s), s), s)− u(X¯(s), v(s), s)] ds+∫ T
t+ e
−ρ(s−t) [u(X(s), φ(X(s), s), s)− u(X¯(s), φ(X¯(s), s), s)] ds+ e−ρ¯(T−t)(F (X(T ), T )−
F (X¯(T ), T ))
]
.
22
Next, we can write E
[∫ T
t+ e
−ρ(s−t)u(X(s), φ(X(s), s), s) ds+ e−ρ(T−t)F (X(T ), T )
]
=
V (x(t+ ), t+ )− E
[∫ T
t+
(
e−ρ(s−t−) − e−ρ(s−t))u(X(s), φ(X(s), s), s) ds+(
e−ρ¯(T−t−) − e−ρ¯(T−t))F (X(T ), T )]
and E
[∫ T
t+ e
−ρ(s−t)u(X¯(s), φ(X¯(s), s), s) ds+ e−ρ¯(T−t)F (X¯(T ), T )
]
= V (x¯(t+ ), t+ )−
E
[∫ T
t+
(
e−ρ(s−t−) − e−ρ(s−t))u(X¯(s), φ(X¯(s), s), s) ds+(
e−ρ¯(T−t−) − e−ρ¯(T−t))F (X¯(T ), T )].
Third, note that
lim
→0+
V (x, t)− V(x, t)

= A+B + C
where
A = lim→0+ 1E
[∫ t+
t e
−ρ(s−t) (u(X(s), φ(X(s), s), s)− u(X¯(s), v(s), s)) ds]
= u(x(t), φ(x(t), t), t)− u(x(t), v(t), t),
B = lim→0+ 1E
[∫ T
t+
(
e−ρ(s−t) − e−ρ(s−t−)) (u(X(s), φ(X(s), s), s)
−u(X¯(s), φ(X¯(s), s), s)) ds+ (e−ρ¯(T−t) − e−ρ¯(T−t−)) (F (x(T ), T )− F (x¯(T ), T ))] = 0,
and
C = lim→0+
V (x(t+),t+)−V (x(t),t)
 − lim→0+ V (x¯(t+),t+)−V (x(t),t)
=
(∇xV (x, t) · f(x, φ(x, t), t) + 12 tr(σ(x, φ(x, t), t) · σ′(x, φ(x, t), t) · ∇xxV (x, t)))
− (∇xV (x, t) · f(x, v(t), t) + 12 tr(σ(x, v, t) · σ′(x, v, t) · ∇xxV (x, t))).
Therefore,
lim
→0+
V (x, t)− V(x, t)

=[
u(x, φ(x, t), t) +∇xV (x, t) · f(x, φ(x, t), t) + 1
2
tr(σ(x, φ(x, t), t) · σ′(x, φ(x, t), t) · ∇xxV (x, t))
]
−[
u(x, v(t), t) +∇xV (x, t) · f(x, v(t), t) + 1
2
tr(σ(x, v, t) · σ′(x, v, t) · ∇xxV (x, t))
]
≥ 0 ,
since c∗ = φ(x, t) is the maximizer of the right hand term in (13).

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